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ABSTRACT
Indigenous social movements began proliferating across Latin America in the late 20th
century. Since then, scholars have focused analyses on the factors shaping indigenous
movement-state dynamics, with little consideration for how these interactions impact the
larger indigenous population. This work addresses the question of how changing
indigenous movement-presidential relationships affect indigenous political attitudes and
behavior in Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru, qualitatively using comparative historical
analysis, and quantitatively using binomial logistical and ordinal logistical regressions. I
conclude first that the inclusion of indigenous movements represents a democratic
deepening, but has a destabilizing effect, as the system must expand and adapt to new
actors; and second, that more representative and inclusive democracies do not necessarily
garner more citizen support or engagement.

v

INTRODUCTION

The UN General Assembly declared 1993 as the International Year for the
World’s Indigenous People. That same year, Rigoberta Menchu, a Guatemalan activist
of K’iche’ descent, won the Nobel Peace Prize for her tireless work combatting the
persistent injustice faced by indigenous communities in Guatemala. Menchu’s efforts
raised global awareness of the plight of indigenous people. In this sociopolitical context
indigenous movements began proliferating across Latin America.
In the central Andean countries of Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru, indigenous
movements organized to resist neoliberalism, the prevailing economic model of the time.
Broadly, their struggle consisted of a set of shared demands, including state led
development, limiting the foreign sector, land reform and establishment of plurinational
constitutions (Silva 2018). In the cases of Ecuador and Bolivia, highland indigenous
organization culminated in the formation of national movements and formal political
parties. In Bolivia, Movimiento Al Socialismo (MAS) began as a coalition of left-wing
organizations, spearheaded by future president and then leader of the coca growers union,
Evo Morales, formalizing its status as a political party in the late 1990s. In Ecuador, the
nationally recognized organized indigenous movement is called Confederación de
Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE) and is a separate entity from the
indigenous political party, Pachakutik. Since the 1990s, the MAS and CONAIE
indigenous movements have deployed their growing influence to advance indigenous
rights within their respective countries, to varying degrees of success. In Peru,
indigenous organization in the highlands remains weak and fractured. This is attributable
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to several factors, including the Sendero Luminoso’s violent repression of indigenous
organizations in the Peruvian highlands during the 1970s and 80s, and Alberto Fujimori’s
decade-long authoritarian reign, which drastically recentralized the government and
rejected ideas of pluralism (O’Neill 2006).
Mass indigenous mobilization in Ecuador and Bolivia garnered such far-reaching
support that their respective governments were obliged to begin acknowledging
indigenous rights to an extent previously unseen in Latin America. During the 1980s and
1990s, state attitudes towards indigenous people in the region were generally classified as
assimilationist (Rice 2017), yet by the 21st century, indigenous movements had managed
to create “new spaces for collective action and transformed the relationship between
indigenous people and the state” (Rice 2017, pg. 3).
The late 20th century thus represents a turning point in the dynamics between
indigenous groups and the state. In Ecuador and Bolivia, indigenous peasants were
organizing and subsequently mobilizing for the first time on ethnic identity. While in
Peru, Alberto Fujimori’s authoritarian style aimed to recentralize government and
suppress ideals of pluralism, which partially explains the lack of political salience of
indigenous identity in Peru. The culmination of these movements in Bolivia and Ecuador
were the election of populist, left leaning presidents, Evo Morales and Rafael Correa in
2006 and 2007, respectively. In Peru, movements were unable to gain traction due to
political instability, however, in the beginning of the 21st century, presidential candidates
such as Ollanta Humala and Alejandro Toledo aggressively courted their electoral
support nonetheless to an extent not previously seen in Peruvian politics (Madrid 2011).
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Regardless of the degree of political salience achieved by indigenous groups in
each country, the state began considering indigenous groups as new actors in the
domestic polity. The evolution of the indigenous-state dynamic in the 21st century has
been the subject of extensive scholarly research, which I explore in Chapter 1. Although
the research makes inferences about how these interactions elicited changes elsewhere in
each country’s government and society, and in the internal dynamics of the organized
indigenous movements themselves, it fails to explore how the interactions registered
changes within the larger indigenous population. A deeper understanding of political
attitudes and behavior within the larger indigenous population could have profound
implications for democratic stability in the region, particularly as governments must
navigate the precarious balance between economic development and marginalized
populations in the context of climate change. Additionally, examination at the individual
level helps determine whether changes in indigenous-state dynamics translate into
tangible benefits for the people they claim to support. To that end, this research asks how
indigenous political behavior and attitudes changed in the 21st century based on
indigenous interactions with leadership in Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia. To do so, I examine
how scholars describe interactions between indigenous movements and the state and then
categorize them into four different groups. The literature focuses almost exclusively on
factors shaping these dynamics, failing to consider the implications for the larger
indigenous population. This research contributes to current scholarship by analyzing the
interactions between indigenous movements and presidents throughout the 21st century
and classifying them by relationship type. Using Latin American Public Opinion Project
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(LAPOP) data, I measure changes in indigenous political attitudes and behavior over the
same timeframe and associate these changes with these relationship types.
Methodology
The independent variable is indigenous interactions with presidents in Ecuador,
Peru and Bolivia from 2000 until 2019. Analyzing scholarly works and newspaper
articles, I provide a historical analysis of interactions between presidents and indigenous
groups in each country in Chapter 2. I then characterize these interactions and sort them
into a descriptive typology organized by interaction type. The purpose of the typology is
to synthesize qualitative findings and present them in a more succinct manner. I then
examine whether presidential interactions with indigenous groups corresponded to
changes in political attitudes and behaviors in the larger population.
To measure the dependent variable, indigenous attitudes and behavior, I rely on
Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) survey data from Ecuador, Peru and
Bolivia. Data is analyzed longitudinally, from 2004 to the most current data set, 2019.
Political attitudes are measured through variables relating to trust in government
institutions, political efficacy, and interest in politics. Political behavior is measured
using variables related to voting and protesting. A dichotomous indigenous variable
helps distinguish between indigenous and non-indigenous respondents. Utilizing survey
data to measure the dependent variable allows for more systematic assessment of changes
at the individual level of analysis over a long period of time. These three cases were
selected due to the asymmetries in political climate and movement success: Ecuador and
Bolivia have had successful indigenous movements that culminated in a democratic
deepening through the broad inclusion of indigenous people into national politics. Peru
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does not have a successful indigenous movement; significant political participation
remains inaccessible to indigenous people and the central government is plagued by
pervasive corruption, producing widespread mistrust and dissatisfaction with politics
among the mainstream population. Given these key differences, Peru serves as a control
case to facilitate attributing changes in the dependent to the effect of indigenous
movements, as well as highlight the possible outcomes associated with the continued
disenfranchisement and marginalization of indigenous populations.
In chapter 1 I examine previous literature on indigenous movement-presidential
dynamics and develop four relationship types based on salient themes in the literature. In
Chapter 2 I provide a qualitative overview of the trajectory of indigenous-state
interactions and then categorize and sort these relationships into a descriptive typology.
The quantitative analysis and discussion of findings is found in Chapter 3, followed by
the conclusion in Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 1
A Review of the Literature on Indigenous-State Dynamics

Scholarship on indigenous-state relations can be divided into four different types
of interactions. The supportive type focuses on coalition building efforts and broadly
classifies interactions as positive (Alberti 2015; Rice 2017; Madrid 2011), and marked by
a bottom-up approach to leadership (Conaghan 2018; Silva 2018). The detached type is
characterizes by presidential indifference towards indigenous movements. This
indifference often materializes as presidents systematically excluding movements from
substantive participation or passively ignoring demands. Inherent to this type is a distinct
top-down approach, in the sense that presidents are in the dominant position vis-à-vis
movements and therefore are able to set the tone and extent of interactions (Silva 2018;
Jameson 2011; Conaghan 2018). Tense relationships are marked by mutual hostility and
often exists against a backdrop of social unrest (McNeish 2006; Albó 2004; Mayorga
2006; Rice 2017). Finally, presidential rhetoric that contradicts actual governance
characterizes the discordant type. The defining attribute of these interactions are
presidents who embrace policies antithetical to their professed pro-indigenous stance
(Bowen 2011; Becker 2013; Ellner 2012).
Supportive Type
Supportive relationships between presidents and indigenous movements consist of
generally positive interactions and coalition building efforts between actors (Silva 2018;
Conaghan 2018; Alberti 2015; Rice 2017; Madrid 2011; Albó 2004). In Ecuador and

6

Bolivia, these efforts consisted of sustained mobilization of leftist organizations united in
a common struggle against the last round of overtly neoliberal presidents from the
beginning of the twenty first century. A portion of these efforts also entailed forming
alliances with ideologically compatible, charismatic leaders, who ultimately won the
presidential election in their respective country. Thus, in Ecuador and Bolivia, coalition
building occurred vertically and horizontally—horizontally among grassroots
movements, and vertically through forging ties with leadership. Upon the election of
Rafael Correa and Evo Morales, dynamics between the two presidents and their
indigenous supporters evolved distinctly.
Silva (2018) and Conaghan (2018) note that the vertical coalition between
CONAIE and Correa strained after Correa was elected, as he systematically excluded the
organized movement while generally retaining the support of the wider indigenous
citizenry through his populist policies. Morales maintained a strong connection to the
vast grassroots network that comprised MAS (Conaghan 2018). Alberti’s (2015) take on
the evolution of the Correa-CONAIE and Morales-MAS relationships is consistent with
Silva and Conaghan, although she emphasizes Morales’ eventual fall from grace. By his
third term in power, indigenous groups had become “ambivalent and conflictive” towards
him (pg. 67), which is likely attributed to certain controversial environmental and
economic decisions that called into question the authenticity of his commitment to the
indigenous agenda. Despite this, the enduring success of MAS even after Morales’
forced resignation in 2019 is a tribute to the supportive alliance that characterized much
of his interactions with indigenous groups, as well as his bottom-up approach to
leadership.
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In Peru, the notable absence of organized indigenous groups in the highlands
precluded opportunities for sustained positive interactions; the lack of an organizational
apparatus with which to articulate demands and forge ties with leadership left individual
groups widely disconnected from national politics. Top-down vertical coalition building
occurred as prospective presidential candidates courted the indigenous electorate.
Madrid (2011) argues that during their presidential candidacy, Fujimori, Toledo and
Humala’s positive interactions with indigenous people were motivated by a desire to gain
their support, which they achieved by presenting themselves as co-ethnics. These appeals
featured both ethnic and populist overtones and were superficial in nature. Ethnic
appeals consisted of the use of indigenous symbols in campaigns, wearing traditional
indigenous clothing and making proclamations in native languages at campaign events
(Albó 2004), while populist appeals included denouncing existing political parties and
elites and emphasizing plans to help the poor. Madrid’s argument highlights an
important distinction within this type, that is those who feign support for the indigenous
to further their own political objectives, as well as the fluid nature of coalition building.
For example, the Cocalero Union?, of which Morales was leader, embodied the broader
struggle against foreign interests in Bolivia by spearheading opposition to U.S.-led coca
eradication efforts in the Chapare. Fragmented groups with similar grievances united and
evolved into MAS. The origins of Morales’ role in the movement were channeled first
and foremost through his cocalero identity. However, as more indigenous groups joined,
and because indigenous identity already overlapped with many of the other identities
involved (i.e. peasant, cocalero, laborer), the movement reinterpreted its identity on an
ethnic basis. Morales’ identity as leader of the movement transformed simultaneously, as
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his Aymara ethnicity became more prominent than that of cocalero. Madrid’s argument
implies the reinterpretation of identity to suit changing objectives.
Detached Type
Silva (2018), Conaghan (2018) and Jameson (2011) posit that some indigenouspresident dynamics are marked by physical or ideological distance between movements
and leadership. Scholars in this approach generally contend that what motivates leaders
is a desire to remain autonomous, either genuinely or in appearance only, of indigenous
movements. Physical distance takes the form of presidential efforts to systematically
exclude indigenous participation across various platforms, while ideological distance
consists of presidents maintaining superficial proximity to a movement through the
granting of minor concessions or tenuous access, while widely rejecting the ideology of
the movement. A president’s unwillingness to breach this physical or ideological divide
characterizes this relationship type.
In analyzing the Correa-CONIAE relationship, Silva (2018) and Conaghan (2018)
argue that Correa’s top-down approach to governance is indicative of a desire to
physically distance himself from CONAIE. Correa achieved this by limiting CONAIE’s
inclusion in substantive political processes. For example, he excluded them from
conventional participation by refusing to appoint indigenous people to significant
political posts and barring CONAIE from weighing in on policy decisions, particularly
those that would heavily impact their communities. The 2008 Ecuadorean constitution
grants indigenous communities the right to consultation prior to the government
sanctioning mining activities in their territories. This has been selectively honored, if not
outright ignored, in practice (Walsh 2010). Correa attempted to block nonconventional
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participation by criminalizing indigenous and environmental activism. This style starkly
contrasts Morales’ supportive bottom-up approach as described in the previous section.
Jameson’s (2011) argument focuses on how ideological distance is manifested in
president-movement dynamics. He concludes that governments navigate ideological
divides between themselves and movements by granting minor demands, often as
concessions, while simultaneously pursuing their own agenda. In the context of Ecuador,
Bolivia and Peru, the most salient example of this ideological distance regards economic
policy. With very little exception, political leaders of the region have pursued neoliberal
economic agendas since the 1980s and 90s despite sustained opposition from indigenous
movements. Such opposition stems from the indigenous assertion that that this particular
model benefits elites and further disadvantages marginalized populations. In the Latin
American context, the neoliberal model tends to rely on natural resource extraction,
whose environmental ramifications pose numerous threats to indigenous culture and
livelihood. Presidents and presidential candidates have leveraged indigenous opposition
to neoliberal practices to suit personal objectives, while quietly preserving their own
ideological commitment to it.
Tense Type
Given the tumultuousness of Latin American politics, indigenous-state relations
across all countries and time periods in this century always include an element of tension
and civil unrest. Indeed, significant change has never occurred in the central Andes or
elsewhere in Latin America without deploying nonconventional participation to some
degree by disenfranchised groups. Scholars of this approach posit that tense relationships
consist of mutual hostility and often occur against a backdrop social unrest. All scholars
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attribute the tension and unrest to extensive structural inadequacies, which diminish the
state’s capacity to incorporate new actors (McNeish 2006; Albó 2004; Mayorga 2006;
Rice 2017).
McNeish (2006) argues that mass protests in Bolivia during the first decade of the 21st
century was attributed to “lack of viable avenues for participation” (pg. 221), which were
exacerbated by internal prejudices. In the 1990s, Bolivia implemented a host of pro-poor
policies that included the Law of Popular Participation, Agrarian Reform laws, and
efforts to decentralize government administration and guarantee indigenous land titles.
As a result, Bolivia was hailed as the gold standard in economic development. However,
by the early 2000s, many realized that the positive effects of these reforms had been
grossly overstated, as rates of poverty had actually increased and access to political
participation had greatly declined. McNeish concludes that genuine democratic openness
was severely lacking because participation was limited to certain groups and on the
state’s terms.
Mayorga’s argument combines McNeish’s (2006) focus on the inadequacy of avenues
for participation with Conaghan’s (2018) emphasis on the failure of traditional political
parties. He echoes Samuel Huntington’s early work in arguing that a “crisis of
governability”, in which the state could no longer interpret nor address social demands,
explains the emergence of political outsiders, such as indigenous movements and populist
leaders (2006, pg. 132; Huntington 1968). He claims that these new actors constitute the
largest contemporary threat to democracy in Latin America because they seek to
undermine liberal democratic institutions and replace them with their own “utopian”
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version of democracy (pg. 133). Mayorga’s argument implies that that liberal democracy
and indigenous political ideology are mutually exclusive.
In stark contrast, Albó (2004) argues that the emergence of indigenous movements as
new political actors is “a very positive development” (pg. 31), because it represents the
opening up of politics to formerly marginalized citizens. He argues that “the installation
of democracies in the region, as imperfect as they may be, opens up political spaces
within which the indigenous can organize and advance their rights in a context that makes
it difficult for judiciaries and security forces to deny citizens’ rights guaranteed under
both domestic constitutions and international conventions” (pg. 31). Thus, the arguments
of Albó and Mayorga (2006) align in their characterization of tense interactions marked
by civil unrest, but diverge in their interpretation of the outcomes. Albó also notes that
many political parties were skeptical of ethnicity, which echoes Conaghan (2018) and
Mayorga’s assessment that the perceived inadequacy of traditional political parties is a
predominant variable in tense indigenous-president relationships.
Rice (2017) asserts that, through the struggle and protests of the 1990s, indigenous
movements achieved a new space for collective action in the 21st century. This new
paradigm emphasizes participation through conventional and nonconventional means.
Rice argues that although indigenous social movements continue to rely on protest, which
is emblematic of a tense relationship with the state, it is precisely through this
deployment of nonconventional participation that they have achieved better access to
conventional participation, in the forms of voting, traditional political parties, and
occupying influential political positions.
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Discordant Type
This type is characterized by a president professing sympathy towards indigenous
movements, while selectively honoring movement demands as part of a broader scheme
to preserve the existing socioeconomic hierarchy. Arguments within this approach are
generally aligned.
Bowen (2011) argues that leadership incorporates indigenous movements into the
political system superficially to minimize threats to existing elites. Becker (2013)
describes a type of symbiosis that exists between indigenous movements and certain
political parties, namely, “leftist political parties cannot gain traction against the
entrenched economic and political interests of the traditional oligarchy without the
enthusiasm and energy of mass social movements, but neither can social movements
achieve their ambitious transformative agenda without gaining control over governmental
structures” (pg. 45). Presidents have come to rely on indigenous social movement
support to further their political objectives, even when these objectives conflict with the
movement’s agenda. To this end, they placate the movements through gestures of
solidarity to retain their endorsement. Ellner (2012) defines interactions through
leadership’s attempts to consolidate power through legitimate constitutional processes,
such as referenda, frequent elections and efforts to promote direct participation. These
measures are successful largely through the support of indigenous movements, despite
the fact that their tacit objective is to preserve existing political structures. Ultimately,
21st century leaders’ failure to authentically incorporate indigenous actors into politics
demonstrates a pervasive unwillingness to genuinely address systemic oppression for fear
of threatening the existing social hierarchy (Bowen 2011; Becker 2013; Ellner 2012).
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CHAPTER 2
Understanding Presidential-Indigenous Dynamics in Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia from
2000-2020: A Historical Analysis

This chapter provides an in-depth qualitative analysis of interactions between
indigenous movements and presidents from 2000-2020 in Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia.
Interactions are characterized into one of the four relationship types outlined in the
literature review (supportive, detached, discordant, tense) and organized into a
descriptive typology. Table 1 illustrates the central actors in presidential-indigenous
movement dynamics within the three cases.
Table 1: Key Actors in Indigenous-Presidential Dynamics
Case
Bolivia
Ecuador

Peru

Name of national
indigenous movement
Movimiento Al
Socialismo (MAS)
Confederación de
Nacionalidades
Indígenas Ecuatorianas
(CONAIE)
None

Size of national indigenous
movement
Large

Name of indigenous
political party
MAS

Moderately Large

Pachakutik

N/A

None

Table 2: Descriptive typology of relationships between presidents and indigenous
organizations 2000-2020
Supportive
Mesa 2003-2005
Morales 2006-2019
Vizcarra 2018-2020

Detached
Quiroga 2001-2002
Rodriguez 2005-2006
PPK 2016-2018
Noboa 2000-2003
Correa 2007-2017
Moreno 2017-present

Tense
Palacios 2005-2007
Sanchez 2002-2003
Garcia 2006-2011

Discordant
Gutierrez 2003-2005
Toledo 2001-2006
Humala 2011-2016

Legend: Peru; Ecuador; Bolivia
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Summary of types:


Supportive- This type consists of generally positive interactions, coalition
building efforts between movements and leadership and a bottom-up approach to
governance.



Detached- This type is characterized by presidential indifference towards
indigenous movements, which takes the form of political exclusion and ignoring
demands. Characterized by a top-down approach to governance.



Discordant- This type is characterized by presidential actions that contradict the
indigenous rights they purport to support.



Tense- This type consists of mutual hostility and usually exists against a backdrop
of social unrest.

Ecuador
Background: CONAIE and President Jamil Mahuad 1998-2000.
Ecuador was in a state of turmoil in 1998. Amid a crippling recession and
runaway inflation, President Jamil Mahuad announced his plan to salvage the failing
economy. Central to this plan was a push to dollarize Ecuador, whose currency at that
time was the Sucre. The dollarization plan drew fierce opposition that exacerbated the
existing and widespread unrest and ultimately erupted into a full-scale mobilization
against Mahuad (Jameson 2011). These uprisings, of which CONAIE was a primary
player, culminated in Mahuad’s ousting in 2000 (Buckley 2000). Mahuad’s departure
represented a victory for CONAIE and solidified their position as a major actor in
domestic politics at the beginning of the 21st century. The leaders of the uprisings
established a junta to replace Mahuad. Called the Government of National Salvation, the
junta was comprised of CONAIE president Antonio Vargas, Col. Lucio Gutierrez and
Carlos Solorzano. They were in power for 24 hours before Mahuad’s vice president,
Gustavo Noboa, was sworn in as president (Buckley 2000; Darling 2000). Although the
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junta only lasted for 24 hours, the fact that CONAIE was a major force in toppling what
they perceived as an ineffectual president, and then CONAIE president Antonio Vargas
was a founding member in the junta, is indicative of CONAIE’s ascendant trajectory.
Detached: CONAIE and Gustavo Noboa 2000-2003
CONAIE had finally gained a national platform to promote indigenous interests
and seemed positioned to enjoy more influence within the political system, the ultimate
goal of which was achieving greater recognition from the state (Albó 2004; Rice 2017).
However, CONAIE was disappointed that their work to topple Mahuad only resulted in a
replacement with identical political and economic ideals, Vice President Gustavo Noboa.
As such, they vocally opposed Noboa’s government from the outset (Darling 2000;
Ecuador: protests 2000). Cognizant of CONAIE’s proven track-record of effecting
change through mobilization and protest, Noboa sought to minimize the potential for
social tensions before the upcoming election cycle by committing to continuous dialogue
with CONAIE (Gerlach 2003). In Noboa’s first month as president, CONAIE presented
a list of demands, which included tangible measures to end corruption and poverty, as
well as economic reforms (Darling 2000). CONAIE also stated its intention to call for a
national referendum.
Gerlach (2003) outlines three main gestures of goodwill extended by Noboa to
CONAIE. First, remaining true to his word, he engaged in negotiations with Antonio
Vargas and reached a tentative agreement on improving healthcare, education, land rights
and housing for indigenous and poor people. In exchange, Vargas agreed that CONAIE
would not incite or participate in any uprisings. Second, Noboa established the “El
Fondo Indígena” (The Indian Fund) with money from the Inter-American Development
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Agency and the Ecuadorean government. Third, he agreed to unfreeze bank accounts and
grant amnesty to low-level participants in the January 15th uprising. While the
government was granting these minor concessions to maintain social harmony, they were
simultaneously pursuing the neoliberal reforms outlined by Mahuad’s administration.
Such reforms included austerity measures, such as terminating gas and food subsidies, as
well as initiatives to expand the privatization of mining, oil and telecommunications and
finalization of the plan to dollarize the economy (Jameson 2011). Furthermore, Gerlach
notes, Congress denied CONAIE’s request for a referendum on the grounds that national
referenda must have congressional approval, which this one did not. Additionally, Noboa
quietly changed the financial terms of the initial agreement with CONAIE to allow the
central government more fiscal flexibility. In response, Vargas terminated negotiations
and shortly thereafter, mass uprisings ensued in response to the austerity measures.
Interactions between Noboa and CONAIE were characterized by a notable give
and take, where Noboa was open to dialogue and granted some superficial concessions,
but did not budge on CONAIE’s more substantive demands relating to the economy.
Understanding how powerful CONAIE had become, Noboa’s desire to maintain open
dialogue represented a strategy to appease the indigenous organization, rather than a
genuine desire to include them. On this Noboa stated, “We're willing to build schools,
roads, and make infrastructure improvements, especially in Indian Areas, but they have to
work with us…” (Jameson 2011, pg. 66-67). Also, CONAIE had popular support to call
for a referendum but was ultimately blocked by Congress. Thus, CONAIE gained
changes through concessions and protest, not conventional participation within the
political system, from which they had been intentionally and systematically blocked. The
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Noboa-CONAIE relationship is characterized as detached. Neither party was outright
hostile or overly supportive, Noboa maintained an open dialogue while deliberately
maintaining CONAIE at arm’s length from any real influence over the policy process.
Detached to Discordant: Lucío Gutierrez 2003-2005
While in prison for his role in the January 15th uprising that deposed Mahuad,
Lucío Gutierrez published a summary of the historic uprising, in which he strongly
implied his consideration of a future presidential bid, saying, “I would try to form a
movement of national identity in which would come together the aspirations of all the
people and nationalities of Ecuador….We think of a great movement that integrates the
Indians, the blacks, the mestizos and all of the underprivileged of this country” (Gerlach
2003, pg. 227). Gutierrez was subsequently pardoned by Noboa and later announced his
intentions to run in the 2002 presidential elections.
Gutierrez had an existing relationship with CONAIE through their mutual
participation in the January 15th uprising. He hailed from a humble background and his
darker complexion gave him a more ethnically proximate appearance to indigenous
voters than previous presidents (Freedom House 2004). Gutierrez won the presidency
largely through the support of a CONAIE-Pachakutik coalition and the relationship
between his government and the indigenous movement started strong. As a gesture of his
commitment to greater inclusion for marginalized groups, Gutierrez named 3 indigenous
people to top cabinet positions, an unprecedented number for the time (Jameson 2011).
His agenda, he promised, would prioritize measures to end corruption and combat
poverty, especially in rural indigenous areas. It soon became apparent that the economic
policies he favored conflicted with the pro-indigenous discourse underpinning his
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agenda. For example, he encouraged private investment in the oil industry and he
increased bus fares and oil prices, opposition to which have been central to CONAIE’s
platform for decades (Freedom House 2004; Jameson 2011).
The relationship eroded over time and eventually, two inciting factors caused the
terminal rupture between Gutierrez and the indigenous coalition that backed him. First,
Gutierrez began cozying up to the U.S. and took several friendly visits to Washington.
Second, he entered into an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (Jameson
2011; Freedom House 2004). These actions were in stark opposition to indigenous
demands, among which were limiting foreign investment in key industries through
nationalization and the rejection of transnational lenders, whose financial support was
accompanied by strict terms that often disadvantaged the poor. Prominent indigenous
groups viewed these actions as a betrayal. Pachakutik publicly revoked support and
CONAIE was left suspicious of Gutierrez’s true motivations (Conaie decidió desconocer
gobierno del coronel Gutiérrez 2004). Shortly thereafter, the Gutierrez-CONAIE
dynamic broke down completely. The indigenous ministers serving in his cabinet
resigned or were forced out (Protestas callejeras en rechazo al precio de los combustibles
2003). CONAIE eventually cut ties, but its relationship with Gutierrez left the
organization internally divided and disconnected from its base (Madrid 2008). As a
result, CONAIE retreated from the national spotlight to regroup and did not participate in
the subsequent uprisings that removed Gutierrez in 2005 (Conaie decidió desconocer
gobierno del coronel Gutiérrez 2004).
Gutierrez-CONAIE interactions at the beginning were mutually supportive.
Gutierrez’s promises to be sympathetic to the indigenous agenda while simultaneously
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advancing overtly neoliberal economic policies, which included U.S. backed efforts to
expand foreign investment in oil as well as working with the IMF, revealed a dissonance
between his rhetoric and actions that is consistent with a discordant relationship.
Discordant to Tense: Alfredo Palacios 2005-2007
Gutierrez lost popularity quickly by imposing harsh economic austerity measures
while simultaneously consolidating power. Social tensions rose steadily during his
presidency and were further inflamed by his decision to dissolve the Supreme Court
(Gutiérrez declara estado emergencia y disuelve la Corte Suprema 2005). Mass uprisings
led by the Forrajido movement ensued. The Forrajido movement was comprised of
mostly mestizo and working-class citizens and was led by future president Rafael Correa
(Silva 2018). Internally divided and alienated from their base, CONAIE declined to
participate (Madrid 2008). Amid the chaos, Congress eventually voted to remove
Gutierrez and Alfredo Palacios assumed power.
Like his predecessors, Palacios was strongly committed to neoliberal reforms.
The Palacios-CONAIE relationship is widely unremarkable. There is no available
scholarly work dedicated to his presidency in the context of this research, and very few
newspaper articles focus on different interactions between him and CONAIE during his
short two-year presidency. The majority of available work focuses on Andean Free
Trade Agreement (AFTA), which this research considers as the defining issue of the
CONAIE-Palacios relationship. Negotiations for AFTA began in 2003 and drew broad
opposition and social unrest across Ecuador, to such a degree that Ecuador withdrew
from collective negotiations to engage in individual negotiations with the U.S. (AndeanU.S. Free-Trade Agreement Negotiations 2005). In November of 2005, CONAIE led a
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march of thousands of indigenous people from across Ecuador’s diverse regions to Quito,
to demonstrate their fierce opposition to AFTA. Upon arrival, they shared a private
audience with President Palacios to outline their grave concerns about how the signing of
AFTA would disproportionately impact their communities (Palacio dialogó con indígenas
en Carondelet 2005). They demanded that Ecuador withdraw from AFTA negotiations
and expel US-based Occidental Petroleum Corp (“Oxy”) from the country over alleged
financial misconduct. Palacios heard their concerns but was undeterred. The signing of
AFTA was planned for March 23, 2006 and the government declined to act expeditiously
in the matter of Oxy’s expulsion. In response, CONAIE led another round of mass
uprisings, which were so fierce and widespread that several northern provinces were
completely paralyzed. Palacios deployed the military to “restore order” by any means
necessary (Creamer 2006; Ecuador: Militant Opposition to Andean Free Trade
Agreement Blockades Several Regions, Moves to Capital 2006). CONAIE issued a
manifesto on March 20th, condemning the signing of the AFTA and accusing the
government of acting in the interest of wealthy elites (CONAIE manifesto 2006). One
sentence from the communique perfectly embodies the indigenous struggle since the
1990s: “We are tired of the rich and powerful in our country; they violate the law,
swindle, steal and in the end have total impunity” (CONAIE manifesto 2006).
Ultimately, Ecuador did expel Oxy and AFTA negotiations were suspended indefinitely.
The Ecuadorean Government stated increased oil revenues as the rationale behind Oxy’s
expulsion, though sustained pressure from CONAIE is cited as a prominent factor by
external sources (Ecuador cancels an oil deal with Occidental Petroleum 2006).
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Although Palacios’ time in office was brief, the chaos surrounding AFTA in many
ways defines his relationship with CONAIE. Palacios’ willingness to engage in dialogue
about AFTA after the initial march to Quito presents him as sympathetic the indigenous
movement. However, AFTA negotiations proceeded nonetheless and were held in the
strictest of secrecy with only wealthy economic and political elites present. Palacios
declined to invite indigenous representatives or incorporate indigenous demands in the
negotiations. This demonstrates that Palacios did not give genuine consideration to
CONAIE’s articulated concerns about AFTA.
The Palacios-CONAIE relationship further decayed after the March 2006
uprising. CONAIE refused to continue recognizing the authority of Palacios’
government, and Palacios accused the indigenous movement of attempting to overthrow
democracy (Las protestas indígenas en Ecuador contra el Tratado de Libre Comercio se
intensifican 2006). The matter of AFTA inspired such mutual hostility between Palacios
and CONAIE, this relationship would be classified as Tense.
Tense to Detached: Rafael Correa 2007-2017
Rafael Correa ascended to the presidency through the support of a broad leftist
coalition, which included both CONAIE and Pachakutik. From the outset, CONAIE had
high hopes that a Correa presidency might finally bring many of their long-held demands
to fruition. His movement, dubbed the “Citizen’s Revolution” promised “economic,
social and political policies that emphasized economic nationalism, state-led
development, redistributive social policies to improve social equity, ecologically
sustainable development, clean government, observance of citizen rights, agrarian
reform, and effective support for indigenous peoples’ rights, especially over territory”
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(Silva 2018). Correa aggressively courted indigenous support through ethnic and
populist appeals (Madrid 2008). For example, his swearing in ceremony took place in the
Andean town of Zumbahua. He wore traditional dress and was presented with a scepter
to represent the bond between his administration and the indigenous communities across
Ecuador. Upon receiving it, he vowed “I will never fail you” (Caseli 2011).
Correa estranged himself from CONAIE soon after his election because of what
many experts have classified as intentional efforts to systematically exclude the
movement from the national dialogue. This exclusion was part of Correa’s broader
attempt to consolidate power. Despite this, Correa retained the support of the larger
indigenous population, who attributed the tangible improvements in their lives to his
social policies (Becker 2013; Silva 2018).
The terminal rupture in the CONAIE-Correa relationship is attributed to the
following: First, Correa labelled CONAIE an interest group and based on this, shut them
out of the policy process (Silva 2018; Conaghan 2018). Correa created public policies to
serve “popular sector interests” (Bowen 2011) while simultaneously excluding groups
representing such interests from the policy-making process (Silva 2018; Bowen 2011;
Radcliffe 2012). Second, In June 2010, Ecuador hosted a summit on minority rights in
Latin America in Ótavalo, a town sacred to indigenous tradition. Leaders and lawmakers
from all over Ecuador and Latin America, including Evo Morales, attended. Invitations
were not extended to CONAIE or Pachakutik (Caseli 2011). Third, Correa aggressively
pursued extractive activities in indigenous territories, despite earlier promises not to,
while selectively honoring if not outright ignoring the constitutionally protected right that
impacted groups be consulted (Silva 2018; Becker 2013; Walsh 2010). Fourth, Correa
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repressed indigenous organization and criminalized activism, which included detaining
activists without due process, forbidding indigenous organizations from participating in
politics, and declaring any organizations not formally authorized by the state illicit
(Becker 2013; Ecuador’s Indigenous People See Protest ‘Criminalized’ Under Correa
2016). As a result, by the end of his first term, Correa had lost the support of CONAIE,
while generally retaining support of the larger indigenous population (Silva 2018).
The Correa-CONAIE interactions have hallmarks of both a tense and a detached
relationship. However, for the purposes of this research, it will be classified as detached.
The tension and mutual hostility flared toward the middle and end of his decade long
presidency are a direct result of his intentional efforts to exclude CONAIE. Distancing
himself from CONAIE provoked the unrest, which waxed and waned, while the distance
was pervasive throughout his presidency.
Detached to Detached: Lenin Moreno 2017-2021
Lenin Moreno served as Correa’s vice president from 2007-2013 and in 2017 he
was elected president, campaigning on a platform of continued populist policies as
championed by his predecessor. The tenuous relationship between Correa and CONAIE
caused indigenous people to overwhelmingly support Moreno’s rival, Guillermo Lasso,
in the 2017 elections (Madrid 2012). When Moreno was declared the winner, CONAIE
published an open letter to the new president, which reaffirmed their collective demands,
encouraged Moreno to take advantage of this opportunity to make genuine change and
reiterated their commitment monitoring his politics (CONAIE Press Bulletin 2017). This
relationship opened on a positive note. During a December 2017 meeting with CONAIE
leadership, Moreno agreed to suspend all new mining permits and scrutinize existing
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permits that were suspected of noncompliance, including the requisite (but often ignored)
measure to consult affected indigenous territories. Additionally, Moreno agreed to
mandating bilingual education, supporting community transportation infrastructure, and
titling land to indigenous communities (Tras cita con CONAIE, Lenín Moreno detiene
conseciones mineras 2017).
Moreno inherited an economy in turmoil due to Correa’s overreliance on oil
exportation and mineral extraction to fund his extensive social programs. The 7.8
magnitude earthquake of April 2016, combined with a dip in global oil prices, which
began in 2014, produced a recession (Bristow and Kueffner 2019) in which the fiscal
deficit reached 8% of GDP (Bello 2019). Second, throughout Correa’s decade long
presidency, public spending had increased to almost 40% of the country’s GDP, and by
2016, debt exceeded the legal limit of 40% of the GDP (Bristow and Kueffner 2019). By
this time, public sector wages had almost doubled and corruption was rampant. For
example, The Economist reports that five major projects featuring PetroEcuador included
roughly 2.5bn in overbilling by contractors (Bello 2019). To confront the growing crisis,
Moreno enacted harsh austerity measures. A key feature of his economic recovery plan
was a multibillion dollar IMF loan whose terms stipulated that effective immediately, the
government must terminate the 40-year old fuel subsidies on which Ecuador’s poor and
indigenous heavily relied (Ecuador’s New Economic Plan Explained 2019). The price of
diesel more than doubled overnight, with a commensurate hike in bus fare (Chappell
2019).
Unrest ensued immediately. Protests began in early October and lasted 11 days,
during which time a state of emergency was declared and Moreno moved the capital to
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the coastal city of Guayaquil for fear that protestors would storm the capitol in Quito. On
October 12th, Jaime Vargas, leader of CONAIE, agreed to enter negotiations with the
president. He cited the following demands: The fuel subsidy be reinstated, that the
negotiations be broadcast national television networks, and that the president promise to
discuss the cessation of extractive activities in their territories (Valencia and Taj 2019).
The two parties reached an agreement on October 13th, and President Moreno promised
to repeal Decree 883 immediately. Upon hearing this news, indigenous protestors
celebrated, cleaned up the city, and promptly went home.
In the wake of the protests and subsequent talks with CONAIE, Moreno
announced the government’s intention to establish a new plan to stabilize the economy,
based on the principal that “those who have more, pay more” (Ecuador President
Proposes New Finances Reforms after Turmoil 2019). Centered on wealth redistribution,
the plan proposed to include new taxes on high earning businesses, and on certain items,
such as plastic bags. No tangible improvements from this plan ever materialized.
Subsequent interactions between CONAIE and Moreno were not overtly friendly. In
October of 2020, CONAIE filed a lawsuit against Moreno for crimes against humanity
for his response to the October 2019 protests (Ecuador: Citizens reject economic
decisions to please the IMF 2019; Ricci 2020). The commission’s finding that Moreno’s
government used excessive force to repress protestors in October of 2019 was made more
egregious by the additional finding that Moreno was acting unconstitutionally when
entering into the first IMF deal. In March of 2020, Moreno announced another set of
austerity measures as part of an IMF loan to address the dire economic situation in the
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wake of COVID-19 (Ecuador: Citizens reject economic decisions to please the IMF
2019). By 2020, Moreno had an approval rating of 9% (Ricci 2020).
The Moreno-CONAIE relationship is characterized as Detached. Although his
presidency is marked by the October 2019 uprisings for their scope and duration, mutual
hostility was not the salient theme of interactions. Throughout his presidency, Moreno
showed a willingness to dialogue with CONAIE, but did not incorporate any of their
demands or suggestions into his decisions, consistent with a distanced relationship.

Bolivia
Background: Hugo Banzer and indigenous people 1997-2001
Former military dictator Hugo Banzer was democratically elected in 1997 under
the slogan “Pan, Techo y Trabajo” Food, Shelter and Work (McNeish 2006). His
government’s primary focus was combatting poverty by strengthening democracy. To
that end, he enacted the Bolivian Poverty Reduction Strategy (BPRS) which aimed to
expand avenues of participation to civil society by creating a national dialogue on matters
such as resource allocation and economic policy (Albó 2004; Mayorga 2006). Later
studies revealed that this did very little to expand participation or alleviate poverty, as
poverty indicators worsened and frequent, and violent protests indicated that avenues to
conventional participation were inadequate (McNeish 2006). One such example of this
were the Cochabamba Water wars, which was a series of protests that occurred in
Cochabamba from 1998-2000 in response to the privatization of Cochabamba’s
municipal water supply. Banzer also adopted a hardline anti-drug agenda, which aimed
to systematically eradicate the cultivation of coca in the highlands. Feeling that their
culture and livelihood was increasingly threatened by neoliberal policies and coca
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eradication efforts, a broad coalition of leftist social movements, including labor unions,
peasant unions and cocaleros (coca grower unions) began organizing (Madrid 2012;
Conaghan 2018; Silva 2018). The movement continued gaining momentum and national
influence, eventually adopting the name Movimiento Al Socialismo (MAS) (Conaghan
2018).
Detached: Jorge Quiroga 2001-2002
Jorge Quiroga, Banzer’s vice president, assumed power when Banzer resigned
due to health concerns. An extensive review of the literature and available newspapers
revealed that there was almost no sustained dialogue or meaningful interactions between
Quiroga and MAS, most likely a result of Quiroga inheriting the presidency (and thus not
needing to appeal to indigenous groups for support), as well as his short time in office.
Needless to say, the most meaningful aspect of his presidency in the context of this
research was the continuation of Banzer’s aggressive coca eradication campaign in the
Chapare. This shortsighted campaign failed to consider the socioeconomic ramifications
for vulnerable and marginalized populations who depended on the coca trade for their
livelihoods. Furthermore, neither Banzer nor Quiroga offered an alternative development
plan for affected populations (Hooper 2005; Mayorga 2006). This, along with Quiroga’s
continued commitment to neoliberal economic policies, further emboldened MAS, who
staged uprisings and protests across the country (New president takes over in Bolivia
2001).
Quiroga’s adherence to a neoliberal agenda through the systematic eradication of
coca characterized his interactions with MAS. There was no overt hostility on behalf of
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his government, yet Quiroga’s agenda stood in opposition to the indigenous demands
articulated by MAS. These interactions are consistent with a detached relationship.
Detached to Tense: Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada 2002-2003
Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, known as “Goni”, served his first term as president
from 1993-1997 and was later reelected in 2002. Goni was a strong proponent of
neoliberal economic reforms, however, mindful of the potential negative effects to
indigenous people, he enacted some corrective measures and also promoted new rights
for indigenous people (Albó 2004). This relationship began on a positive note, but was
soon embittered by the event that came to define his presidency: the Gas Wars and
subsequent brutal repression of protestors, for which Goni was later tried and convicted
in the United States in 2018 (Ramos 2018).
The Gas Wars erupted in October of 2003 in opposition to Goni’s plans to export
natural gas through Chile to the U.S. This plan was highly contentious due to vast
opposition to natural gas privatization and the acrimonious relationship between Bolivia
and Chile, which began with the Atacama border dispute in the 1800s and was
exacerbated by the War of the Pacific, when Bolivia lost its Pacific coastline and became
a landlocked state. MAS spearheaded the protests, and soon more groups of laborers,
coca farmers and other indigenous and non-indigenous organizations of the left joined.
In response to the unrest, Goni dispatched the military, who engaged in brutal repression.
Goni attempted several times to quell the unrest, the most notable of which was to offer a
referendum on the issue of natural gas exportation (Assies 2004). McNeish (2006)
importantly notes that the referendum did not include the citizens most opposed to the
reforms, rural and indigenous populations. MAS and others on the left continued to
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demand his resignation. Goni eventually conceded and submitted his resignation on
October 17, 2003 (Octubre negro: cronología del caso que enlutó a Bolivia 2018). Evo
Morales, the leader of MAS and a highly visible indigenous figure in the Gas Wars, later
centered his presidential campaign on the nationalization of key industries, which he
promptly enacted upon winning the election (Relea 2003).
The majority of scholarly works and newspaper articles contextualize Sanchez de
Lozada’s interactions with MAS and other indigenous groups by the Gas Wars. This
research therefore considers the Gas Wars, a bloody and violent event, the issue that
defines the Goni-MAS interactions and characterizes the relationship as tense.
Tense to Supportive: Carlos Mesa 2003-2005
Carlos Mesa was Goni’s vice president and assumed power after Goni was
deposed. His presidency, although short-lived, is considered a major turning point in
Bolivian politics. At this time, the national dialogue was centered on the question of
natural gas nationalization (Relea 2003), a contentious topic which further exacerbated an
existing regional divide between the leftist indigenous people of the highlands, and the
traditionally wealthy, European descendants of the eastern lowlands (Webber 2010;
Assies 2004). Counterintuitively, Mesa enjoyed sustained support from MAS and
Morales despite the fact that his policies were not overtly aligned with the indigenous
agenda. Some speculate that this was a calculated move on Morales’ part to present
himself as more politically moderate to attract conservative mestizo voters in anticipation
of the 2006 elections (Webber 2010). Indigenous groups unaffiliated with MAS did not
support Mesa, as they felt his policies served the interests of the wealthy elite who
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demanded open markets and business ties with neighboring countries (Webber 2010;
Forero 2004).
Mesa was caught between blocs with diverging interests: the leftist indigenous
highlanders and the conservative European lowlanders. He spent the entirety of his
presidency precariously navigating these opposing forces, never fully committing to
either side. This led to the eventual collapse of his government. On this Webber says,
“His neoliberal reformism was insufficiently generous in its concessions to the October
Agenda to secure the support of the left-indigenous bloc, which began to assert once
again the necessity of fundamental structural solutions to the problems of racism,
poverty, inequality, class exploitation, and imperialism. At the same time, the easternbourgeois bloc was growing increasingly discontented with his moderate adherence to the
minimal demands of the October Agenda” (2010, pg. 57). Although Mesa eventually lost
the support of MAS for what they perceived as a weak stance on royalties for foreign
companies operating in Bolivia, his presidency began with a proclaimed commitment to
supporting indigenous rights (Relea 2003). He appointed two indigenous cabinet
members and executed a referendum on the natural gas industry and taxes, promising to
commit to gradual nationalization of the gas industry (Webber 2010; McNeish 2006).
The Mesa government is an interesting study within the Bolivian case. The nonMAS affiliated leftist indigenous groups opposed him throughout the duration of his
presidency, yet MAS under Morales’ leadership was his closest political ally until shortly
before his resignation (Webber 2010). Assies (2004) suggests that this very allegiance
explains the absence of demonstrations and uprisings during his presidency. When the
government set out to reform the new hydrocarbons law, MAS demanded 50% royalties
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be charged on the profits of foreign gas companies (Webber 2010), which Mesa, not
wanting to anger his neoliberal backers, failed to enact. In response, MAS publicly
denounced Mesa and mobilized grassroots forces to stage uprisings across the country in
what had come to be known as the second gas wars. This event ultimately prompted
Mesa’s resignation in 2005. The issue of full gas nationalization became the cornerstone
of Morales’ presidential campaign in 2006 (McNeish 2006).
Although the end of Mesa’s presidency was marked by mutual hostility with
MAS, the majority of their interactions were supportive. It is notable that Mesa did not
make grand gestures of support to the indigenous cause, instead, MAS, under the
guidance of Morales, intentionally moderated its stance on many issues to better align
itself with Mesa. One must also reiterate the divergence between MAS and non-MAS
indigenous groups in their attitudes towards Mesa. Indigenous groups vehemently
opposed him and his neoliberal economic policies, despite his close alliance with Morales
until they cut ties in 2004. Although the relationship terminated amidst widespread social
unrest, the majority of interactions preceding the second Gas Wars were consistent with a
supportive relationship.
Supportive to Detached: Eduardo Rodriguez 2005-2006
Following Mesa’s resignation, Eduardo Rodriguez, then Chief Justice of the
Bolivian Supreme Court, assumed the presidency on an interim basis. When he assumed
power, social unrest was ongoing over the question of whether or not to nationalize the
natural gas industry (El jefe de la Corte Suprema, Eduardo Rodríguez, Sucede a Carlos
Mesa como president de Bolivia 2005). There is scarce literature dedicated to
Rodriguez’s policies or governance and what is available focuses on the unprecedented
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circumstances facing Bolivian society at that time: four presidents in 5 years, widespread
civil unrest, a country divided by region, race, ethnicity and class, and the ongoing and an
increasingly acrimonious national debate on the gas industry. Rodriguez did not make
any significant changes during his short time in office, stating that his primary goal was
not to raise his political profile, but to restore order in anticipation of a general election.
Rodriguez announced that he would respect the results of Mesa’s referendum on
hydrocarbons and would let the winner of the 2006 general elections address the
lingering question of whether to nationalize the natural gas industry (El jefe de la Corte
Suprema, Eduardo Rodríguez, Sucede a Carlos Mesa como president de Bolivia 2005; de
Zárate 2014). A divide between MAS and the larger indigenous population appeared
under Mesa and widened throughout Rodriguez’s presidency. Morales extended a truce
to Rodriguez, further inflaming tensions with other indigenous groups who continued to
demand the full nationalization of the natural gas and hydrocarbon industry (Bolivia
prepara la reforma constitutional para renovar todos sus cargos politicos 2005).
As there is little available evidence of sustained interactions between Rodriguez
and MAS, whether positive or negative, this relationship is characterized as detached.
Detached to Supportive: Evo Morales 2006-2019
Evo Morales was elected president of Bolivia in 2005 and assumed office in 2006.
A rural coca farmer of Aymara descent, he emerged as the leader of Bolivia’s coca
growers union (cocaleros) in the 1980s through his campaign against U.S. led efforts to
eradicate coca farming in the Chapare region of Bolivia (Albró 2019). In many ways, the
social conflicts of the previous years, most notably the coca eradication of the Chapare,
the Water Wars of 2000 and the Gas Wars of 2003 and 2005, shaped Morales’
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presidential agenda as he promised to finally deliver results on many of these long-held
grievances of the indigenous population. Such grievances included decolonizing and
nationalizing key industries, extending political inclusion to marginalized groups, and
expanding environmental protections in indigenous territories. In this way, the Morales
presidency breached the existing divide in the indigenous community between MAS
supporters and non-MAS, as MAS began attracting more support from previously
unaffiliated indigenous people. According to LAPOP data, in the 2005 elections, 9% of
indigenous people voted for Evo Morales and MAS, while 20% of indigenous people
supported Morales and MAS in 2009.
Prior to Morales’ election, indigenous Bolivians experienced inequitable access to
avenues to conventional participation (Albró 2019; McNeish 2006). Recognizing this,
Morales’ movement forged a path to participation for the country’s most marginalized
citizens. He made early campaign promises to protect their political and human rights by
vowing to write a new constitution. Bolivia adopted the new constitution in 2009, which
defines Bolivia as plurinational, non-capitalist state, guided by the Quechua principle of
Buen Vivir, or Living Well (van Schaick 2009). Once elected, Morales staffed 14 out of
the 16 cabinet positions with indigenous men and women (Albró 2019). As MAS gained
popularity, more and more indigenous people were elected to regional and national posts,
thus expanding indigenous political inclusion. The broad inclusion of indigenous people
into politics is one of the greatest achievements of Morales’s presidency (Albró 2019). In
bringing awareness to the indigenous cause, Morales also gave visibility to the
indigenous way of life, which is often absorbed and overshadowed by the dominant,
capitalistic culture.
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Two main pillars of Quechua culture are the good of the group over that of the
individual, and deference to nature and the environment. Their conception of
development emphasizes collective advances, such as a new school or clinic for the
community, and remains strictly opposed to the extraction based economic development
strategies pursued by modern Latin American governments (Bjork-James 2020). Seeing
their territory destroyed, stripped of resources or sold off to private interests, indigenous
people have witnessed firsthand the harmful effects of economic development policies
centered on natural resource extraction. In 2006 Morales announced his economic plan
called Bolivia Digna, Soberana, Productiva y Democratica Para Vivir Bien, which
denounced such unsustainable practices, and promised to align Bolivian development
with the tenets of Sumak Kawsay—living in harmony with nature, placing spiritual wellbeing over acquisition of goods, and collaboration over competition (Pinneo 2014).
Further exemplifying his purported commitment to environmentalism, he passed an
unprecedented Law of Mother Earth in 2012, the first of its kind, which equates nature’s
rights with human rights (Ramirez 2019). In 2010 he sponsored a UN Resolution, which
makes access to clean water and sanitation a human right (Ramirez 2019). These large
shows of support for environmental protection endeared him to indigenous and
environmental activist groups nationally and internationally for a time.
Six years into his presidency Morales began losing the trust and support of his
indigenous backing because he diverged from his pro-environment platform. The initial
rupture came in 2011 when his government tried to build the Villa Tunari–San Ignacio de
Moxos highway through the Isiboro Sécure National Park and Indigenous Territory
(Stauffer 2018; Bjork-James 2020). He fostered relationships with opposition groups in
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agribusiness that were built on concessions, which included everything from promoting
biofuels to “not following through on the regulation of the social-economic functions of
medium-sized landholdings and business-scale landholdings, which allowed large
landowners to preserve their ownership of land.” (Bjork-James 2020). The divide further
widened when he constructed a $34 million presidential skyscraper and residence in the
historical Plaza Murrillo (Stauffer 2018), a move that stood in stark contrast to the values
of Buen Vivir he supposedly espoused. Throughout all of this, Morales was quietly
consolidating his power in defiance of the presidential term limits outlined in the new
constitution, resulting in his serving 13 years and 3 terms in power (Stauffer 2018). After
disputed results for election to what would be his 4th term, Morales fled to Peru in fear for
his safety (Stauffer 2018).
Evo Morales changed the face of Bolivian politics and society. He gave a voice
to the country’s millions of disenfranchised indigenous people and improved their quality
of life drastically: Poverty fell from 60% in 2006 to 35% in 2017 (Dearden 2019) and
indigenous culture gained hitherto unknown prominence in society. These interactions
were both Supportive and Discordant in nature. However, despite a contentious end to
his presidency, his legacy is overall a positive one and is widely consistent with a
Supportive relationship. His symbolic gestures were insufficient to retain indigenous
support. According to 2019 LAPOP survey data, only 5.5% of indigenous respondents
indicated that they would support the current? president. Jeanine Añez served as interim
president after Morales’ departure from 2019-2020.
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Peru
Much of the literature on Peruvian indigenous movements focuses on Amazonian
groups, who have historically had better organizational capacity and national visibility
due to ongoing disputes over extractive practices in the Amazon. As such, the Peru case
will not use a specific indigenous organization as the unit of analysis, because highland
indigenous organizations are regional, tend to only represent regional interests, and
interact more sporadically with national leadership and thus are not equivalent to the
movements analyzed in Ecuador and Bolivia. Therefore, this section will use the term
“indigenous organizations” or “indigenous people” to collectively refer to the individual
indigenous movements of the highlands and assumes that these atomized groups broadly
align in their objectives and views on national leadership.
Background: Alberto Fujimori 1990-2000
While campaigning for the presidency, Alberto Fujimori actively courted the
indigenous electorate. This strategy consisted of adopting a pro-indigenous discourse
while simultaneously distancing himself from elites. Outsider status was central to his
political platform. He also wore traditional indigenous dress, held campaign events in
sacred locations and employed indigenous symbology throughout his campaign (Madrid
2011). At the same time, Fujimori made populist appeals that appealed poor and
disenfranchised people, many of whom were indigenous. For example, he focused his
campaign in socioeconomically disadvantaged areas and promoted his ideas to alleviate
poverty, such as legalizing street vendors and to creating a bank to lend to businesses in
the informal sector (Madrid 2011).
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Once elected, Fujimori did not fulfill any of these promises. He dramatically
restricted civil liberties, aggressively centralized the government and overtly rejected any
ideals of pluralism (Albó 2004). He adopted a robust market-oriented economic agenda
that went in direct opposition to many of his pro-poor campaign promises, and while it
stabilized the economy, it left impoverished citizens far worse off (Madrid 2011; Boesten
2007). Fujimori’s administration was hostile to indigenous people. From 1996-2001, his
government undertook a forced sterilization campaign in the Peruvian highlands.
Occurring only in the highlands, the campaign was sold to the public as family planning
assistance. It was later revealed that the project’s true intention was economic benefit,
because poor indigenous people were perceived to be preventing economic growth,
Fujimori attempted to alleviate this by forcibly restricting their population size (Boesten
2007; Ko 2021)
After winning reelection once, Fujimori’s regime finally collapsed in 2000 and
left Peru in disarray. It destroyed democratic institutions, weakened political and social
actors and further disadvantaged vulnerable populations. Despite his authoritarian
legacy, he is widely credited with defeating the Sendero Luminoso guerrilla group.
Discordant: Alejandro Toledo 2001-2006
Alejandro Toledo was elected president during a precarious time in the ongoing
dynamic between Peruvian indigenous people and the state. He employed similar
campaign strategies as Fujimori to woo electoral support from indigenous people,
speaking frequently of his Incan roots and wearing traditional Incan clothing (Albó 2004;
Madrid 2011). Toledo was of indigenous decent and was raised in rural poverty in the
Chapare, apart from that, however, he was far removed from Quechuan culture, having
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been educated in the U.S. and now positioned firmly among Peru’s elite (Peru Reports).
Toledo employed populist rhetoric to win over indigenous voters by denouncing political
parties while his wife, a Belgian, spoke Quechua on his behalf at campaign rallies.
Similar to Fujimori, Toledo campaigned directly to the poor, many of whom were
indigenous. For example, he often held events in poor neighborhoods and promised to
expand social programs, such as health insurance for disadvantaged women and children,
agricultural banks to provide loans to small farmers, and promises to improve sanitation
of shanty towns in Lima (Madrid 2011; Greene 2006). Additionally, Toledo aggressively
sought alliances with indigenous and peasant organizations.
To fortify his alliance with the indigenous community absent genuine
commitments to economic reform, the first lady created the National Commission on
Andean, Amazonian and Afro-Peruvian Peoples (CONAPA). The Commission elicited
heavy criticism from the general public for its presumably political motives and
conspicuous lack of indigenous leadership. In response to this, Toldeo attempted to
regain some approval points by creating the Development Institute for Andean,
Indigenous, Amazonian and Afro-Peruvian Peoples (INDEPA) as a concessionary
gesture (Greene 2007; Greene 2006)
Many of these overtures to indigenous people were little more than empty
gestures. Despite his promises to pursue the core demands of the indigenous agenda and
his efforts to expand political inclusion1, his presidency was plagued by scandal and
accusations of corruption (Puertas 2004; Forero 2004). Despite this, there was an
explosion of ethnic politics under Toledo as Andean and Amazonian groups tried to unite

1

Madrid (2011) reports that 70% of congressional representatives had indigenous surnames in the 20012006 session of congress.
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under one large umbrella organization. Toledo’s pattern of contradicting words and
actions is consistent with a discordant relationship.
Discordant to Tense: Alan García 2006-2011
Alan Garcia served his first term as president from 1985-2000, during which time
his mismanagement of economic and social issues left a weak and divided Peru aptly
positioned for authoritarian Alberto Fujimori to win the election. García narrowly beat
left-of-center candidate Ollanta Humala in 2006.
García aggressively pursued a neoliberal economic agenda underpinned by robust
and unapologetic mining practices in the Peruvian Amazon. Indigenous people perceived
this as a direct assault on their territory and cultural rights, garnering García immediate
and sustained hostility from indigenous people for the entirety of his presidency (Stetson
2012). Determined not to repeat the economic disasters of his first presidency, experts
report that his dogged commitment to economic growth above all else was achieved at
the expense of socioeconomic development, (Welcome, Mr. Peruvian President: Why
Alan García is no hero to his people 2010; Collyns 2010)
Much of the indigenous-García dynamic involves Amazonian groups, as the
salient interactions involving the two centered on oil, mining and logging rights by
multinational corporations in the Amazon. Garcia further marginalized indigenous
communities by not consulting them about these practices, which provoked a massive
uprising in Bagua that killed as many as 40 indigenous protestors. Despite later
admitting that not consulting indigenous groups was wrong (Welcome, Mr. Peruvian
President: Why Alan García is no hero to his people 2010), Garcia’s government engaged
in a propaganda war, which smeared indigenous people as antidevelopment (Stetson
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2012). They aired short clips of indigenous demonstrations, portraying them as blood
thirsty and violent criminals trying to harm the humble policemen. Garcia’s government
publicly accused the indigenous people of wanting to hold Peru back from development
(Aiello 2009; Collyns 2010). Garcia’s legacy is a bloody one, the Guardian reports that
“According to Peru's public ombudsman, 195 people were killed in clashes with security
forces between January 2006 and September 2011; most of them died during García's
five-year term” (US Congress offers support for Peruvian Amazonia land disputes 2009;
Peru’s indigenous people: From García to Humala their battle goes on 2012). The
sustained, mutual hostility between indigenous groups and García, which unfolded
against a backdrop of widespread civil unrest, is consistent with a Tense relationship.
Tense to Discordant: Ollanta Humala 2011-2016
Ollanta Humala employed similar strategies as Fujimori and Toledo to appeal to
indigenous voters by prominently featuring ethnic demands in his campaign for
presidency. For example, he called for recognition of Peru as a multicultural country and
endorsed multicultural education and the use of indigenous languages in the military and
government offices. He demanded the legitimization and incorporation of traditional
practices of indigenous medicine and justice, and vocally denounced ethnic inequality.
He purported to support a redistributive and state led economic model and vowed to
defend Peru’s natural resources from foreign exploitation, in stark contrast to Toledo’s
heavy reliance on foreign investment and resource privatization (Madrid 2011). As a
result, he won the support of Peru’s indigenous organizations.
Shortly into his presidency, Humala passed a historic law giving indigenous
people the right to consultation on mining projects on their territories, a measure that was
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repeatedly blocked in all forms by García (Collyns 2010). Although this represented a
historic victory for indigenous people, it soon became apparent that Humala would fail to
deliver on many of his most prominent pro-indigenous campaign promises, especially
regarding economic policy (Ollanta Humala Peru Reports; Peru’s indigenous people:
From García to Humala their battle goes on 2012; Stauffer 2011). Furthermore, given his
pivot away from the leftist ideology espoused while campaigning in favor of a distinctly
more market-oriented approach, people were rightly skeptical about whether the new
consultation law would be genuinely upheld (Stauffer 2011). This concern came to
fruition, as protests erupted over government approval of the U.S.-led Conga mine in the
Cajamarca region (Peru protests at huge Conga gold mine in Cajamarca 2011).
As social tensions flared, Humala publicly called for dialogue with indigenous
groups to resolve the disputes, while quietly deploying the military to repress protests
(Peru’s indigenous people: From García to Humala their battle goes on 2012). Amazon
Watch reports 150 conflicts over the environment and mining in the highlands under
Humala (Miller 2016).
Interactions between Humala and indigenous people had elements of a supportive
relationship, such as the Law of Consultation, and of a tense relationship, such as the
militaristic handling of social unrest. However, the salient feature of interactions
overtime were Humala’s tendency to promise one thing to indigenous people and then do
different thing in practice. Therefore, this relationship is characterized as discordant.
Humala was a vocal supporter of the indigenous agenda, yet failed to deliver on almost
all substantive promises throughout the duration of his presidency.
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Discordant to Detached: Pedro Pablo Kuczynski 2016-2018
Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, known as PPK, had previously served twice as economy
minister and mining minister. He supported free market economic policies and made
frequent claims about wanting to improve socioeconomic equality in Peru, though he
made no specific mention of indigenous people in these promises (Who is Peru’s new
leader Pedro Pablo Kuczynski? 2016). Besides supporting an initiative to broadcast news
and radio in Quechua to fight discrimination of indigenous people, there is no evidence of
any notable interactions sustained over time between PPK and indigenous organizations
(Nickolau 2016; Peru’s Indigenous Language Push 2017). Shortly after winning the
election, evidence implicating PPK in a graft scandal surfaced, and proceedings to
remove him began in 2017 (Fowks 2017; Kurmanaev and Zarate 2019). He resigned in
2018.
Detached to Supportive: Martin Vizcarra 2018-2020
Literature about the relationship between indigenous highland communities and
Vizcarra is sparse. This can be explained by several factors. First, as he was not elected
outright, he did not personally need to forge bonds with indigenous communities through
overtures of support for their cause. Second, Peru’s political history is one of rampant
corruption and profound instability, and as a result, trust in political institutions is among
the lowest in Latin America (Carrión 2019). Accordingly, Vizcarra’s agenda seems to
focus mainly on anti-corruption efforts. In 2019 he enacted his constitutional right to
dissolve a Congress whose internal political rivalry was obstructing the government’s
ability to legislate (Quigley 2019; Tegel 2019). Congress responded by accusing him of
executing a coup on Peruvian democracy and attempting to suspend him (Tegel 2019).
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Vizcarra’s dissolution of Congress meant that new general elections would be called,
empowering Vizcarra to govern by decree in the meantime. Ultimately, this move gained
him great popularity among Peruvians, as evidenced by his approval rating jumping from
52% in September to 82% in October (Quigley 2019). Third, the indigenous groups
native to the Peruvian Amazon are embroiled in more visible conflicts given that the
majority of natural resource extraction, a highly contentious and widely reported on issue,
occurs in the Amazon. Finally, highland indigenous communities do not have an
organized, national movement (Callirgos 2018; O’Neil 2011; Yashar 1998), in stark
contrast to Ecuador and Bolivia who have highly organized and politically mobilized
highland indigenous movements. Peruvian highland communities, therefore, do not have
a formalized communication apparatus to articulate their demands or maintain dialogue
with leadership.
Unlike Correa and Morales, who appealed to indigenous groups on a wide breadth
of long-held issues, Vizcarra made no formal commitments about broadly incorporating
the indigenous platform into national politics. However, he has made one promise to
indigenous groups: in a July 2019 meeting with indigenous leaders, Vizcarra doubled
down on a May 2018 promise that his administration would title all indigenous
communities by 2021 (AIDESEP y Presidente Vizcarra se reúnen para asegurar titulación
de todas las comunidades indígenas para antes del 2021 2019). This would be a huge
step forward for indigenous rights, and by default, environmental protections. Studies
suggest that indigenous people face more bureaucratic hurdles to becoming titled than
non-indigenous people (Getting a Land Title in Peru Almost Impossible for Indigenous
Communities 2015; Fraser 2019) and government agencies are ill equipped to navigate
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the complexity of requests due to lack of cultural understanding (Fraser 2019). Further
studies indicate that land titled to indigenous groups show smaller rates of deforestation
and are generally healthier than non-indigenous owned counterparts (Blackman, Corral,
Santos Lima, Asner 2017).
Unlike Correa and Morales who endeared themselves to indigenous groups by
purporting to enforce strict environmental regulations and curb resource extraction in
their territory (although ultimately failing to do so), Vizcarra has made no such promises.
In fact, in July of 2019 he granted a permit for the Tia Maria mine, a project that has been
in limbo for a decade due to local opposition (Cervantes 2019). Vizcarra’s government
has opposed a bill proposing to close off portions of the Amazon to logging to protect
vulnerable indigenous communities from exposure to coronavirus. As of 2014, 21% of
Peru was controlled by mining concessions, most of them foreign (de la Flor). Vizcarra
presided over a country heavily occupied by multinational mining operations, while
indigenous people, lacking formal representation, resort to mass protests to oppose these
practices and the damage inflicted to their communities (DuPee 2019). In November of
2020, Congress voted to remove Vizcarra on vague charges of corruption and
mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic. A popular uprising in support of Vizcarra
ensued, as many Peruvians saw him as the only viable means to ending rampant
corruption in the political system (Armario and Briceno 2020). Indigenous people
protested the ousting of Vizcarra and demanded the new president, Manuel Merino, step
down.
The relationship between indigenous organizations and Vizcarra had ups and
downs, with periods of hostility and unrest interwoven with periods of great support and
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mutual admiration. The extent of Vizacarra’s indigenous support was only apparent after
his forced departure, when thousands took to the street in protest. Vizcarra did not make
grand promises to indigenous people and then quietly do the opposite, nor did he woo
their support for personal gain. He adopted a transparent and pragmatic approach early,
and evidence suggests that he attempted to act in good faith, despite the occasional and
fierce unpopularity of some environmental and economic decisions. Overall, relationship
is characterized as supportive.

Figure 1: Relationship type by year
Tense

Discordant

Detached

Supportive

While president-indigenous movement relationships during the first 8 years of the
twenty first century all show variability by type across all three countries, relationships
tended to be more volatile in Peru and Ecuador. Stability in relationship types in Ecuador
and Bolivia from 2008-2018 are attributed to the decades-long presidencies of Morales
and Correa. This is a compelling finding when considering the relative strength of each
country’s indigenous movement. Peru, who has the weakest movement, has had longer
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and more frequent periods of discordant and tense relationships, the two types generally
associated with negative interactions. Bolivia, who has the strongest indigenous
movement, has longer and more frequent periods of detached and sympathetic
relationships, generally associated with neutral or positive interactions. Thus, larger
indigenous movements are associated with more positive president-movement
relationships. However, as we will see in the subsequent section, they are not always
associated with democratic institutional stability. The relationship between wellorganized indigenous movements and positive president-movement relationships could
be explained by the fact that larger indigenous movements tend to have the clout and
resources available help their preferred candidates get elected. Conversely, some
presidents may feel obliged to maintain positive relationships with the larger, more
powerful movements to minimize the likelihood of protests and social unrest. Indeed,
both the Ecuadorean and Bolivian movements have a proven track record of removing
undesirable presidents through mass mobilization and the deployment of nonconventional
tactics: CONAIE was a principal actor in deposing two Ecuadorean presidents since
1996, and the Bolivian indigenous movements that comprise MAS led the mobilizations
that ousted two presidents since 2000.
Bolivia and Ecuador have had significant presidential instability and extremes
throughout the 21st century: Ecuador has had three partial term presidents due to being
forcibly deposed (Mahaud, Palacios Gutierrez) and one president who consolidated
power over time to eventually serve a full decade in office (Correa); Bolivia has had four
partial term presidents (Mesa, Quiroga, Rodriguez, Sanchez) forcibly deposed and one
president who consolidated power to end up serving over a decade in office (Morales).
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Both Correa and Morales enjoyed widespread support from indigenous people. In
contrast, Peru is known for extensive government corruption and dysfunction, yet has had
all but one president in the past two decades serve full terms (PPK). These findings
would suggest that while the political inclusion of indigenous movements certainly
strengthens democratic institutions by extending participation to previously
disenfranchised populations, thereby increasing representation, it may have a
destabilizing effect on politics as Huntington suggested. As these movements gain power
and meaningful access to further their agenda, the system becomes more susceptible to
volatility as it must expand and contract to accommodate new actors.
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CHAPTER 3
Regressions and Discussion of Findings

Analysis
This section proceeds in two parts. The first part features a broad exploration of
political attitudes, behavior and efficacy in the general populations of Ecuador, Bolivia
and Peru from 2000-2019. Political efficacy will be examined in addition to indicators
for attitudes and behavior because it assesses the health of civil society, which is directly
linked to citizen participation and perception of politics. In the second part, I will focus
my analysis on the indigenous population in the year 2019, using binomial and ordinal
logistic regressions and controlling for standard demographic and socioeconomic factors.

To measure political attitudes, I rely on two LAPOP questions:
1. To what extent do you trust political parties? Responses were coded from
(1)not at all – (7) a lot.
2. To what extend do you trust the president? Responses were coded from
(1)not at all – (7) a lot.
3. How much interest do you have in politics: A lot, some, a little, none?
Responses were coded from (1) none – (4) a lot.
To measure political efficacy, I rely on the following LAPOP questions:
1. Politicians care about what people like you think. To what extent do you
agree or disagree with this? Responses were coded from (1) strongly disagree
– (7) strongly agree.
2. You feel that you have a good understanding of the most important political
issues in the country. To what extend to you agree or disagree with this?
Responses were coded from (1) strongly disagree – (7) strongly agree.
To measure political behavior, I rely on the following LAPOP questions:
1. In the last 12 months, have you participated in a demonstration or public
protest? Results originally coded as (1) yes or (2) not.
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2. If the next presidential elections were this week, what would you do?
Responses were coded as (1) I wouldn’t vote, (2) I would vote for the current
president or party, (3) I would vote for the opposition candidate or party, (4) I
would cast a blank ballot.
General trends in political attitudes and behavior over the 21st century
Figure 2: average participation in a protest in the last 12 months by year

The previous section concluded that stronger indigenous movements are
associated with more positive president-movement dynamics, but may have a
destabilizing effect on democratic institutions, if only temporarily, as the system adapts to
accommodate new actors and demands. Figure 2 generally supports that claim. Bolivia,
the country with the strongest indigenous movement of our 3 cases, has consistently
higher percentages of participation in a protest in the past 12 months. In some cases, it is
more than twice as high as Ecuador. For example, in 2016 there are 13 percentage points
difference between Ecuador and Bolivia’s participation.
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Contrary to expectations, Ecuador’s rates of participation in a protest are
consistently below 10%. This could be attributed to the criminalization of protest under
Correa, which certainly discourages widespread participation. It could also be that
people were generally satisfied with his policies and governance and therefore did not
feel compelled to protest. Despite opposition from CONAIE, most rural, poor and
indigenous communities benefitted from Correa’s drastically increased social spending.
To achieve local improvements, Correa diverted federal funding through local
municipalities, who were charged with the undertaking of various public work projects in
the name of the central government. Thus, citizens of these communities saw tangible
improvements as coming directly from Correa’s government. Under this clientelist
system, Correa ensured their ongoing support by establishing a direct link between local
improvements and his government (Silva 2018).
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Figure 3: Voting intentions by year

I would not vote

I would vote for
the current
president

I would vote for
the opposition
candidate

I would cast
a blank
ballot

Figure 3 shows that on average, people would vote for the opposition candidate or
party if elections were next week. This illustrates the general cynicism and distrust of
politics in these three countries. For example, even in years with more popular presidents
(such as Vizcarra in Peru from 2018-2020), respondents still indicated they would vote
for the opposition, on average. The closest we see to a value of 2 (I would vote for the
current candidate or party) is in Ecuador in 2008 and 2014, which coincide with Correa’s
presidency. In 2016 and 2018, respondents were more likely to vote for the opposition in
Ecuador on average. This aligns with Moreno’s presidency. Figures 4 and 5 support
these findings in the case of Ecuador.
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Figure 4: average trust in political parties by year

The results of Figure 4 are somewhat counterintuitive based on the results of the
historical analysis and the descriptive typology of relationships. Conaghan (2018),
Madrid (2008) and Mayorga (2006) all argue that it was the failure of traditional political
parties that permitted political outsiders to emerge, indigenous political parties and
presidential candidates more specifically. Therefore, one would assume that the rise of
MAS, whose inclusive platform and overwhelming popularity in national politics, would
generate higher levels of trust in political parties among the people. Instead, trust declines
sharply the year Morales (and MAS) take office and remains at below average levels until
2019. This suggests that MAS did not enjoy high levels of support in the larger
population. Shockingly, respondents in Peru and Bolivia (situated at opposite ends of the
spectrum in the context of this research), have maintained roughly the same below
average levels of trust in political parties throughout the 21st century. Overall, Bolivia
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registers a 1.5 unit decrease on the x and Peru only registers a .5 unit decrease. This
means that there was a larger decline in trust in political parties in Bolivia than Peru. All
of this suggests that increasing representation by incorporating formerly marginalized
groups does not necessarily translate into higher levels of trust within the mainstream
population.
Ecuador’s trust in political parties follows a positive trend, which coincides with
most of Correa’s time in power. Trust declines in Ecuador post-2014, shortly before the
election of Moreno. This is counterintuitive because Correa and Moreno were from the
same party, Alianza Pais (AP), therefore one would expect similar levels of trust. This
suggests that peoples’ perception of a political party is heavily influenced by their
opinion of its leader. Correa, and AP by default, were widely popular among poor, rural,
working class and mestizo voters. Once elected, Moreno immediately reversed nearly all
of Correa’s social spending policies and enacted extreme austerity measures to address an
impending economic crisis. This caused him to lose the support of the electorate who
had supported Correa.
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Figure 5: Average trust in the president by year

On average, Peruvians have consistently lower levels of trust in the president
from 2000-2020, which is consistent with expectations. The 1 unit spike in 2012
coincides with the presidency of Ollanta Humala. Humala espoused a left-leaning
populist rhetoric while campaigning and throughout the beginning stages of his term.
Shortly into his presidency, he began embracing the garden variety resource extraction
based neoliberal model common to the region. While the pivot to neoliberalism was
supported by the private sector elites, to the mainstream population it revealed Humala to
be yet another disingenuous politician, flip flopping between stances to suit his personal
objectives. Trust increases in Peru in 2016, which coincides with Vizcarra’s assuming
office. Vizcarra enjoyed extensive support among the larger population for his strenuous
commitment to combatting corruption in the government.
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In Bolivia, Morales maintained slightly above average levels of trust within the
larger population throughout his presidency. In Ecuador, levels of trust in the president
are consistent with levels of trust in political parties: increasing under Correa, then
sharply declining under Moreno. In Ecuador, Correa’s generous social expenditures
provided under a clientelist system sharply contrasts with Moreno’s austerity measures,
suggesting that overall trust in government institutions is associated with the state’s
provision of benefits.

Figure 6: political efficacy by year

Figure 6 shows us that in Ecuador and Bolivia, where the inclusion of indigenous
movements has increased participation to formerly disenfranchised citizens, people may
feel that politics is more accessible. Accessibility of politics instills a sense of agency
over the unseen forces that impact peoples’ lives. Levels of political efficacy in Peru are
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lower than in Ecuador and Bolivia across the board, which aligns with expectations given
the chronic government corruption and resulting distrust among the larger population. It
is notable that efficacy levels in Peru are highest from 2016-2019, which coincides with
Vizcarra’s time in office.

Figure 7: Understanding of politics by year

According to Figure 7, respondents in all 3 countries report average levels of
understanding of politics from 2008-2019. One would expect to see Ecuador and Bolivia
have significantly higher levels of efficacy than Peru given that expanded avenues to
participation is indicative of a more representative democracy. The fact that levels are
basically consistent across all three countries suggests that citizens remain widely
disconnected from politics. Graphing interest in politics by year also shows very low
levels of interest across all years in all countries, which supports the finding that citizens
are generally disengaged.
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Summary of Part I findings
Based on the figures above, political attitudes and behavior in Ecuador, Bolivia and
Peru are generally consistent with the results of the historical analysis. Ecuadorean
respondents’ higher levels of trust in institutions and lower levels of protesting underpin
the previous claim that Correa, while remaining unpopular with CONAIE, enjoyed
widespread support among mainstream voters, most likely for his generous social
spending. Peru’s respondents showed consistently lower levels of trust and efficacy and
higher levels of protesting. Taken as a whole, these results are indicative of pervasive
disengagement, most likely the result of widespread dissatisfaction with a dysfunctional
political system, comprised of corrupt institutions and inept leaders.
One would expect to see Bolivia have similar results as Ecuador, given the
parallels between the strong indigenous movements and left leaning populist presidents
both of whom served for roughly a decade in power. Counterintuitively, Bolivia’s results
are closer to Peru than Ecuador overall, especially regarding participation in protests,
trust in political parties, voting intentions and trust in the president. Furthermore, all
three countries have the same average to low levels of political efficacy over time. All of
this is to suggest that expanding participation and representation in a democratic system
does not necessarily translate into higher amounts of engagement or support within the
larger population.
This idea is supported by the discordant type as described in the literature review,
which posits that presidents and presidential candidates feign support for
socioeconomically disadvantaged citizens while quietly enacting policies that directly
benefit elites and preserve the existing social hierarchy. In other words, because a
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democracy appears sympathetic to the needs of vulnerable populations does not mean
that elected officials will represent their interests in good faith. Therefore, expanding
participation to formerly disenfranchised and marginalized groups does not necessarily
translate into higher levels of trust or efficacy in the larger population.
Part II: Regressions
Measuring changes in political trust, behavior and efficacy in the larger
populations of Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia helped to reveal general trends overtime. The
results of the historical analysis helped contextualize these trends within the broader
sociopolitical climate of the 21st century. I will now engage in a more focused analysis
by employing binomial and ordinal logistic regressions to determine the current state of
indigenous political attitudes and behavior in 2019. This year is significant because it is
immediately following the presidencies of Correa and Morales. Indigenous movement
empowerment and growth is directly linked to these presidencies; their respective
decades in power ushered in a critical turning point in marginalized citizens’ ability to
advance their rights from within the system. Analyzing indigenous attitudes and
behavior in 2019 will illuminate the legacies of Correa and Morales in Ecuador and
Bolivia, respectively. Especially in terms of whether the indigenous-state dynamics
under these two leaders translated into tangible benefits for the larger indigenous
population. The control case of Peru will help attribute changes in the dependent variable
to the effect of indigenous movements in Ecuador and Bolivia, as well as highlight what
is at stake should indigenous people remain on the margins. In all models, I control for
the standard socioeconomic and demographic factors, including, age, sex, municipality,
education, and income.
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Indigenous Trust in the President
Prior to the indigenous awakening of the 1990s, this demographic was largely
overlooked. Relegated to the margins of society, continue to endure high levels of
systemic repression. As indigenous groups across Latin America began organizing in
opposition to neoliberalism—and finding incremental success-- the existing paradigm
governing indigenous-state relations began to shift. In Ecuador and Bolivia, this
transformation was evidenced by the election of Rafael Correa and Evo Morales, two
explicitly left leaning, populist presidents with a strong indigenous backing at the start.
In Peru, where indigenous identity has not achieved salience, numerous presidents over
the 21st century have courted their widespread electoral support through grand gestures
and bold promises, with very little of substance actually occurring after their election.
Using ordinal logistic regression, models 1a-1c examine the relationship between
trust in the president and indigenous ethnicity in Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia using a 2019
LAPOP question that asks, “To what extent do you trust the president?”

Table 3: Trust in the President
Independent Variables

Indigenous
Ethnicity

Socioeconomic
Indicators

Ethnicity
(1) indigenous – (0) not indigenous
Education
Last academic year completed successfully
Income
Number of consumer goods owned by respondents
Gender
Women = 0 Men = 1
Municipality Size
1=rural; 2=small city; 3=medium city; 4=large city;
5=capital
Age
Measured in age cohorts

Model 1a
Trust in President
Ecuador
-.270
(.198)
-.024
(.013)
-.510*
(.247)
-.031
(.092)
-.082**
(.031)
-.002
(.015)
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Model
Summary

Nagelkerke Pseudo R Squared
N

.020
1481

This table reports coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses.
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Independent Variables

Indigenous
Ethnicity

Socioeconomic
Indicators

Model
Summary

Ethnicity
(1) indigenous – (0) not indigenous
Education
Last academic year completed successfully
Income
Number of consumer goods owned by respondents
Gender
Women = 0 Men = 1
Municipality Size
1=rural; 2=small city; 3=medium city; 4=large city;
5=capital
Age
Measured in age cohorts
Nagelkerke Pseudo R Squared
N

Model 1b
Trust in President
Bolivia
.-307*
(.136)
-.111***
(.012)
-.565*
(.269)
-.180
(.092)
-.082**
(.029)
-.028
(.015)
.100
1495

This table reports coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses.
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Independent Variables

Indigenous
Ethnicity

Socioeconomic
Indicators

Model
Summary

Ethnicity
(1) indigenous – (0) not indigenous
Education
Last academic year completed successfully
Income
Number of consumer goods owned by respondents
Gender
Women = 0 Men = 1
Municipality Size
1=rural; 2=small city; 3=medium city; 4=large city;
5=capital
Age
Measured in age cohorts
Nagelkerke Pseudo R Squared
N

Model 1c
Trust in President
Peru
.477***
(.124)
-.031*
(.014)
.270
(.240)
-.197
(.095)
-.066*
(.033)
.039*
(.016)
.023
1420

This table reports coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses.
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
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Models 1a-1c show indigenous likelihood to trust the president in 2019. The
variables in this model predict 10% of trust in the president in Bolivia, which is the
highest percentage of the three models. When controlling for key socioeconomic and
demographic indicators, indigenous people in Peru are significantly less likely to trust the
president than indigenous people in Bolivia, who are slightly more likely. This is
counterintuitive to Figure 5, which shows that in 2019, trust in the president in the larger
population is on the ascent in Peru, and the descent in Bolivia. This suggests that there is
a discord between indigenous perceptions of the president and the general population’s
perceptions of the president in those countries. Indigenous ethnicity was not significant
in the case of Ecuador when predicting trust in the president, which is to be expected
given the overwhelming and immediate dissatisfaction with Lenin Moreno throughout
Ecuador. This result tells us that indigenous ethnicity was not a factor when determining
trust in Moreno, because nobody really seemed to trust him. Municipality is significant
in all models, which shows that where people live—rural town, large city, etc.—impacts
the likelihood of whether they trust the president.

Indigenous Participation in Protests
Table 4: Participation in Protests
Independent Variables

Indigenous
Ethnicity

Socioeconomic
Indicators

Ethnicity
(1) indigenous – (0) not indigenous
Education
Last academic year completed successfully
Income
Number of consumer goods owned by respondents
Gender
Women = 0 Men = 1

Model 2a
Participation in
Protests
Ecuador
.825*
(.328)
-.010
(.028)
.326
(.522)
.044
(.032)
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Model
Summary

-.025
(.067)

Municipality Size
1=rural; 2=small city; 3=medium city; 4=large city;
5=capital
Age
Measured in age cohorts
Nagelkerke Pseudo R Squared
N

.044
(.032)
.014
1477

This table reports coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses.
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Independent Variables

Indigenous
Ethnicity

Socioeconomic
Indicators

Model
Summary

Ethnicity
(1) indigenous – (0) not indigenous
Education
Last academic year completed successfully
Income
Number of consumer goods owned by respondents
Gender
Women = 0 Men = 1
Municipality Size
1=rural; 2=small city; 3=medium city; 4=large city;
5=capital
Age
Measured in age cohorts
Nagelkerke Pseudo R Squared
N

Model 2b
Participation in
Protest
Bolivia
.211
(.201)
.28
(.019)
1.015*
(.403)
.001
(.139)
-.050
(.044)
-.017
(.023)
.018
1507

This table reports coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses.
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Independent Variables

Indigenous
Ethnicity

Socioeconomic
Indicators

Ethnicity
(1) indigenous – (0) not indigenous
Education
Last academic year completed successfully
Income
Number of consumer goods owned by respondents
Gender
Women = 0 Men = 1
Municipality Size
1=rural; 2=small city; 3=medium city; 4=large city;
5=capital
Age

Model 2c
Participation in
Protest
Peru
.519**
(.185)
.066**
(.023)
.730
(.395)
.313*
(.156)
-.139*
(.054)
.081**
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Model
Summary

Measured in age cohorts
Nagelkerke Pseudo R Squared
N

(.026)
.051
1427

This table reports coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses.
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Models 2a-2c use binomial logistic regression to explore the relationship between
participation in a protest and indigenous identity by using a 2019 LAPOP question that
asks, “Have you participated in a protest in the last 12 months?” The variable was
recoded so that (1) has participated in a protest and (0) has not participated. The
variables included in this model predict the largest portion of the dependent variable in
Peru, predicting around 5% of participation in a protest. All variables in the model
except income are significant in Peru.
In Ecuador, indigenous identity was significant when predicting participation in
a protest and controlling for key socioeconomic and demographic indicators: .825 more
indigenous respondents reported having participated in a protest than non-indigenous
respondents in the last 12 months, on average. In comparing these results with trends in
the larger population, we can assume that the levels of protesting in Ecuador shown in
Figure 2 are indicative of indigenous participation in a protest, which supports the finding
that, as a proportion of the total population, there were more indigenous protesters than
non-indigenous from 2000-2020.
In Bolivia, indigenous identity is insignificant in predicting participation in a
protest when controlling for all other factors. Given the trends over time shown in Figure
2, indigenous identity’s insignificance in predicting protest is consistent with
expectations because many Bolivians were protesting, not just indigenous Bolivians.
Moreover, not all of the organizations of the left driving protests identified primarily with
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indigenous ethnicity (many were labor unions, coca growers, women, etc.), although
there was likely significant overlap with indigenous identity.
According to the data, the main differences in protesting behavior in Bolivia and
Ecuador are that in Bolivia, everyone was protesting, while in Ecuador, it seems that
mostly indigenous were protesting. This could be attributed to key internal differences in
each country’s respective indigenous movement, MAS and CONAIE. MAS retained a
broad base of support beyond ethnicity due to its inclusive platform, while CONAIE’s
platform became increasingly politically and ethnically motivated, which alienated nonindigenous supporters (Madrid 2012). Therefore, when these organizations mobilized to
protest, MAS was able to mobilize support beyond coethnics, while CONAIE did not
enjoy such broad appeal.
Voting Behavior
The original 2019 LAPOP question about voting asks, “If voting were being held
this week, what would you do?” (1) I would not vote, (2) I would vote for the current
president or party (3) I would vote for the opposition candidate or party (4) I would turn
in a blank ballot. To facilitate binomial logistic regression and to account for the fact that
voting is mandatory in each of these three cases, the voting variable was recoded to make
it dichotomous, so that the previous values of (2) and (3) =(1) I would cast a valid vote,
and the previous values of (1) and (4) =(0) I would cast a blank ballot.
Indigenous identity is not significant in predicting voting behavior in any of our
models. Indigenous identity is not significant in predicting voting behavior in any of our
models, which means that an indigenous person is just as likely to cast a valid vote or a
blank ballot as a non-indigenous person. A question central to the study of ethnic politics
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is, are coethnics more likely to support each other electorally, why or why not? These
findings suggest that indigenous presidents do not necessarily attract more electoral
support from indigenous voters.
Notably, education level is significant in all Models (3a-3c). Expanding access to
quality public education has proven a persistent challenge in this region, particularly in
rural, indigenous areas. Education level directly impacts the accessibility of conventional
participation, from knowing how to access and interpret information about voting
logistics or candidate platforms, to the role of literacy in reading and filling in the ballot.
Morales and Correa’s social policies included expanding access to bilingual public
education in the Andean highlands. These models show that there is a significant link
between education and casting a valid vote.
Table 5: Voting Behavior
Independent Variables

Indigenous
Ethnicity

Socioeconomic
Indicators

Model
Summary

Ethnicity
(1) indigenous – (0) not indigenous
Education
Last academic year completed successfully
Income
Number of consumer goods owned by respondents
Gender
Women = 0 Men = 1
Municipality Size
1=rural; 2=small city; 3=medium city; 4=large city;
5=capital
Age
Measured in age cohorts
Nagelkerke Pseudo R Squared
N

Model 3a
Voting Behavior
Ecuador
-.297
(.233)
.084***
(.016)
.207
(.291)
.225*
.109
-.149***
(.038)
.038*
(.018)
.049
1446

This table reports coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses.
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
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Independent Variables

Indigenous
Ethnicity

Socioeconomic
Indicators

Model
Summary

Ethnicity
(1) indigenous – (0) not indigenous
Education
Last academic year completed successfully
Income
Number of consumer goods owned by respondents
Gender
Women = 0 Men = 1
Municipality Size
1=rural; 2=small city; 3=medium city; 4=large city;
5=capital
Age
Measured in age cohorts
Nagelkerke Pseudo R Squared
N

Model 3b
Voting Behavior
Bolivia
.088
(.167)
.033*
(.015)
-.054
(.324)
.253*
(.111)
-.031
(.035)
.048
(.019)*
.016
1374

This table reports coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses.
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Independent Variables

Indigenous
Ethnicity

Socioeconomic
Indicators

Model
Summary

Ethnicity
(1) indigenous – (0) not indigenous
Education
Last academic year completed successfully
Income
Number of consumer goods owned by respondents
Gender
Women = 0 Men = 1
Municipality Size
1=rural; 2=small city; 3=medium city; 4=large city;
5=capital
Age
Measured in age cohorts
Nagelkerke Pseudo R Squared
N

Model 3c
Voting Behavior
Peru
.181
(.144)
.065***
(.017)
.610*
(.280)
.082
(.110)
-.053
.038
.017
(.019)
.031
1384

This table reports coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses.
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
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CHAPTER 4
Conclusion

This research attempted to fill a gap within existing literature on the relationships
between indigenous movements and the state by asking, how do these interactions
register changes in the larger indigenous population? The historical analysis provided a
summary of interactions between indigenous movements and presidents in our three
cases since 2000, and classified and sorted interactions into a descriptive typology of
relationship type: supportive, detached, tense and discordant. Graphing relationship type
by year in the three countries (Figure 1) illustrated that relationships were generally more
positive in Bolivia, more neutral in Ecuador and more negative in Peru and found that the
cases containing larger, more well-organized indigenous movements were associated
with more positive interaction types, and the case with a weak and fragmented movement
had more negative relationship types.
Findings from the Typology of Relationships and Figure 1 suggest that countries
with stronger indigenous movements experience more institutional instability, manifested
in erratic presidential patterns and higher levels of protesting. Bolivia and Ecuador both
had several partial term presidents each after these presidents were ousted by mass
protests (in which indigenous movements played a prominent role in all examples except
Gutierrez in Ecuador). This string of partial term presidents was followed,
simultaneously in both countries, by the election of populist leaders who ultimately
consolidated power through constitutional means and ended up serving over a decade
each in power. In stark contrast, Peru, who, although possessing a regionally divided and
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weak indigenous movement, has had all presidents since 2000 serve full terms (with the
exception of PPK). Therefore, the erratic and unpredictable nature of presidential
continuity in Bolivia and Ecuador may be attributed to the presence of powerful
indigenous movements in these countries.
Scholars have theorized about how the inclusion of indigenous movements would
impact democracy in the region. Mayorga (2006) argues that their inclusion represents a
grave threat to democracy, while Rice (2017) and Albó (2004) assert that their inclusion
represents a strengthening of democratic institutions. This work suggests that it is not
one or the other, but both. While the inclusion of formerly disenfranchised people does
in fact represent democratic deepening, it also has a destabilizing effect as the system
must expand and adapt to new actors.
Counterintuitively, the graphed trends overtime reveals several notable instances
where Bolivia and Peru were more similar than would have been expected (see Figures 2,
4, and 5). This suggests that a more inclusive and representative democracy through the
inclusion of indigenous movements does not necessarily translate into broad mainstream
support. Indicators for political efficacy and interest in politics are below average across
the whole timeframe and show very little variability by country, which is indicative of the
polarization and mass disengagement with politics in the region.
This work presents several opportunities for continued research. First, the
relationship types in the descriptive typology were classified after undertaking an indepth survey of scholarly works and newspaper articles. In the future, it would be helpful
to develop a set of measurable indicators based on recurring themes in interactions to
classify types in a more systematic and empirical manner. Additionally, discussion of the
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regression findings in this work only featured an explanation of variable significance and
direction. Future research will offer a more in-depth analysis of the relationships
between variables.
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